The recent retirement of Jorge Posada after a phenomenal 17-year career has led to many heartfelt tributes and retrospectives, analyzing what he has meant to the Yankees throughout his tenure. Yesterday, John Sickels over at Minor League Ball took a look at Posada’s progression through the minors, and how scouts and prospect evaluators looked at him. It’s a great read that is definitely worth checking out.
Jorge’s minor league trajectory was unusual because he was not considered a top prospect at any point in his minor league career. He was drafted in the 24th round out of high school in Puerto Rico, but ultimately signed as a draft-and-follow (in the pre-signing deadline era) after playing community college. He was drafted as a shortstop and spend the first season of his minor league career playing 2nd base. The next year, the Yankees decided to move him to catcher. The transition was rough, but he showed some promise at the position, and showed solid offensive production.
Posada was never a standout performer in the minors, but always showed decent power and plate discipline. These of course were skills that he also demonstrated throughout his major league career. The Yankees promoted Posada pretty aggressively through the minors, even having him skip from high-A to AAA in 1994 (for what reason, I don’t know). He then spent 2 years in AAA, stuck behind Mike Stanley and Joe Girardi at the major league level, before making his major league debut in 1996.
It is interesting that according to Sickels, at his best, Posada was never more than a C+ prospect in the minors. Considering he went on to become 5-time all star and a borderline hall of famer, it is hard to say that anyone could have predicted Posada becoming the kind of major league player that he did considering his undistinguished minor league career. Perhaps this speaks to the limitations of scouting when Posada was coming up, since his skills were not apparently well-recognized in the minors. It is also highly likely that Posada’s work ethic helped him to make the most of his skills, and he continued to make substantial improvements throughout his major league career. In any case, it is players like Jorge Posada that make following the minors so much fun. He wasn’t a top prospect that everybody saw coming, but he gives reason to follow players throughout the system, just in case one can defy the odds and become a future franchise icon.
“Red Sox, Yankees … Red Sox, Yankees … I don’t care about the Red Sox and Yankees. We have to take care of ourselves. This is the most important year in the four years I’ve been here. This is your chance, from right now, to decide what kind of team you want to be.”
General manager J.P. Ricciardi is addressing his troops in a classroom down a hallway from the main clubhouse. Like schoolkids the players fill the desks in the back of the room but leave most of the ones up front unoccupied. This is what is known as the annual orientation meeting, ostensibly to introduce the training, coaching and support staff — and this year one embedded reporter — but also for the manager and general manager to set the tone for the season.
The Blue Jays are a blank slate. After a surprise third-place finish with 86 wins in 2003, Toronto sank to the basement in the American League East last year, losing 94 games. The Jays are Liechtenstein in a division with Cold War superpowers New York and Boston. Toronto’s best player, first baseman Carlos Delgado, signed with Florida as a free agent. In front of Ricciardi and Gibbons sit only four players who have made an All-Star team, and only one who has hit 30 home runs, centerfielder Vernon Wells. As if to acknowledge his increased importance to the club, Wells is the one player who dares to sit front and center, casually munching an apple.
So wrote Sports Illustrated’s Tom Verducci seven years ago this spring.
Can any three paragraphs better describe the state of the Toronto Blue Jays since their string of World Series victories in the early 1990s? In the last fourteen years, the Blue Jays have won between 78 and 88 games twelve times. Once they won 75, another 67, but those years were anomalies. The Jays have just once risen above third place. They have just once fallen bellow fourth. But more than this consistent competitive mediocrity, an unfulfilled hope has characterized most pre-season discussion of these rosters.
The Blue Jays are never leading the pack. They never have the best farm system, the best roster, the best financial situation. But they’re always that surprise team. They’re always that team everyone picks to come out of nowhere. They have, often, but they’ve never closed the deal.
Of late, a new hope has risen on the horizon of Toronto sports. Led by part-GM, part-wizard Alex Anthopoulos, a resurgent farm system bolstered by the trade of Roy Halladay to the Phillies two years ago, and the emergence of an offensive superstar, Jays fans have reason to believe that maybe, just maybe, this time it’s for real. But there are plenty of clouds dotting that horizon. Former offensive stars have dimmed. A young rotation has failed to develop. The Jays won just 81 games this past season and have been relatively quiet since the World Series. The signing of Yu Darvish, for a time considered a forgone conclusion, never happened. Darvish is in Texas and the Jays rotation is still an area of concern.
For us Yankees fans, this is a good sign. The Blue Jays have the management and young talent to be the Rays of tomorrow and anything that keeps them from reaching that potential is a barrier in the path of a team looking to unseat the Yankees. But there’s still plenty of optimism among Jays management and fans. The question is whether this optimism will be met – if not this year, then at least in the near future. Let’s take a look at the roster.
Behind the plate, the Blue Jays have a pair of young players with promise, though one a clear long term option, the other perhaps an afterthought after a poor 2011 season. JP Arencibia entered last season a rookie of the year candidate. His power and overall offensive prowess, his ability to hit like few catchers in the league, made him a sought after commodity. His .219 batting average last season reinforced the belief that the power will not alone keep his bat serviceable. Travis d’Arnaud, the team’s top prospect, looks to replace Arencibia behind the plate. He showed off his own 20+ home run power last season but also hit .311 in the Eastern League. d’Arnaud should make it to the big leagues this season. How quickly is largely a product of the Jays’ early season record.
The infield is an area of strength for Toronto. Yunel Escobar finished second among Blue Jays’ hitters in fWAR lsat season, hitting .290 with a .369 OBP, and playing good defense at short. The deal that sent Escobar to Toronto is looking like a good one a year and a half out. Dito the Kelly Johnson trade. Johnson picked up his production late in the year and should be a consistent contributor for Toronto next season. At first, the Jays have Adam Lind, and while Lind’s skill set still lurks behind the conversation, his 2009 explosion is starting to look more like an outlier than a breakout. Finally you have the Jays most exciting player, Brett Lawrie. A defensive liability (though his numbers last season don’t show it) it’s hard not to compare Lawrie to his former orginization-mate, Ryan Braun, also a Brewers third base prospect of old. Lawrie is an offensive monster. He hit .291 last season in 41 games with a .413 wOBA. He hit 9 home runs and stole 7 bases. Lawrie is going to be a superstar.
In the outfield you have one great player, and a couple of unknowns. Jose Bautista has emerged over the past two seasons as one of the leagues best players and should continue to mash home runs for the Jays next season. 2011 was perhaps another step forward as he honed his approach at the plate, though his second half slide is just a tad bit concerning. The real question marks here remain the left and center fielders. Colby Rasmus, once one of the more promising young outfielders in the game, struggled after a trade to Toronto. The talent is there. The upside is huge. The performance is a question, though. Left field is up for grabs, but one of the candidates to play the position is Travis Snider, the former top prospect in all of baseball. Snider was probably rushed to the big leagues and an issue of approach has held him back. The upside, like with Rasmus, is still there but he’s a long way from being a productive big leaguer.
All those question marks aside, offense is a strength for Toronto. Especially if some of their pieces rebound, you can expect a run-producing machine up north. The real question is one of pitching.
The rotation is promising but ultimately a mess. While 2011 may have looked like a breakout year for Ricky Romero, the underlying numbers don’t agree with that assessment. His FIP rose more than half a run, his xFIP by 16 points. Should we expect Romero to continue to pitch well? Sure. But not that well. Brandon Morrow is at the exact opposite end of the luck spectrum. His stuff, his talent, his peripherals indicate a future ace. The results are disheartening. Jays fans should continue to hope for a breakout but the longer it doesn’t happen, the less likely it is that it will. Brett Cecil and Jo-Jo Reyes both had terrible years for the Blue Jays. Cecil at least has some history to fall back on. Finally, Kyle Drabek failed miserably in delivering on the top-prospect hype he brought over from Philadelphia. He’s too young not to get another chance, but he was terrible.
The Blue Jays bullpen should be improved next year with White Sox closer Sergio Santos coming over, to go along with Francisco Cordero and Casey Jannsen and a number of other talented arms. Really, though, it’s the rotation that matters and the rotation is nothing short of a disaster. The minor league system is stocked with arms, but not so many at the high levels of the system, and in the near term one has to wonder where the help will come from.
Now that you have a better idea of what Toronto brings to the table, you can probably guess what I’m going to say next. Yes, we should be worried about the young talent Toronto brings to the table but even if the questions are answered affirmatively and even if that offense comes together around two young superstars and around Rasmus, and Lind, and Johnson, and the rest the pitching is just too poor for the Blue Jays to contend with the Yankees, Red Sox, and Rays. Morrow is promising. He and Romero could form a nice 1-2 punch. But Drabek is almost an afterthought at this point, Cecil is coming off a terrible season, and there isn’t much else there. If the Blue Jays look a like a potential surprise contendor, you aren’t looking close enough.
With that being said, in the long run, this could be different. They aren’t that surprise team. There isn’t the same buzz. But the Jays do finally have great management, perhaps the best management, in Anthopoulos and that scouting department. The Jays do have a strong farm system, perhaps the best farm system. They have arms in the lower levels and impact talent on the offensive side of the ball. They have a strong financial situation – they can afford to go after top free agents again. And for the first time since the middle of this past decade, they are building an offensive core. Bautista, Lawrie, Rasmus, d’Arnaud, and the rest of them. If the arms pan out, if the Jays can find some pitching depth for that rotation, they do have what it takes to compete a year or two down the road.
On Wednesday, Jonathon Mayo of MLB.com released his 2012 Top 100 Prospects. The Yankees had four players land on the list, Manny Banuelos at 13, Dellin Betances at 41, Gary Sanchez at 53, and Mason Williams at 73. It was no guarantee that we’d see Sanchez or Williams on such a list, but what surprised me most is the aggressive Manny Banuelos ranking.
Courtesy of Christopher Pasatieri
With Montero out, Banuelos is clearly the best prospect in the Yankee farm system. A left handed 20 year old pitcher with low to mid 90’s heat, possible plus changeup and curveball, and with solid numbers in AA and AAA is nothing to scoff at. Despite this, there are a lot of factors that must go right for Banuelos to develop on the level he’s been hyped. Where scouts demand that he simply needs more consistency, they also say he needs to take steps forward with his breaking pitches and cutter, drastically improve the command, and add velocity to his fastball. Though I believe Banuelos could accomplish all these things, assuming a 20 year old will improve every facet of their game is a large order.
I have faith in Banuelos, but the MLB.com prospects list did the unthinkable Wednesday, they ranked the current Yankee number one prospect ahead of the former number one prospect. They’ve since shifted the placement, ranking Jesus Montero 12th and Manny Banuelos 13th. In my opinion, it makes little difference. Comparing Montero, a major league ready and possible middle of the lineup star, to a 20 year old with plenty to work on before the majors, is far too aggressive. Where Montero’s ceiling is competing perennially for the batting title, Banuelos is a tier lower, aiming to become a number two or three starter. The gap between players is far from the space between 12 and 13.
It’s exciting to see your favorite prospect atop prospect rankings. With top 100 list season approaching, this is a reminder to stay realistic. Especially with the New York media surrounding young players, we are bound to read hype. I’m as thrilled about Banuelos as any fan, but no amount of hype will replace the player we lost in Montero.
We did this yesterday with Michael Pineda, so let’s do it with Hiroki Kuroda today. For info on how this works, click back to yesterday’s post. You can find Kuroda’s splits here. The same caveats as yesterday apply. The numbers listed after the jump are the park adjusted numbers.
Tuesday night, on MLB Network Radio, Pirates GM Neil Huntington said about trading Andrew McCutchen,
“Never say never. If someone wants to back up the truck and give us one of those organization-altering deals, it’s something that we’d have to listen to, but there are some players on our club that are extremely difficult to move. It would have to be a dramatic overpay on the part of the other club.”
Christian Petersen - Getty Images
Who is Andrew McCutchen? He’s a five-tool player who hit .259/.364/.456, with 23 homeruns, 23 stolen bases, and a 5.7 fWAR at the age of 24. If any player projects to be a superstar, it’s McCutchen. That type of immediate right handed power and outfield depth is certainly lacking in the Yankees’ farm system, and is something that needs to be addressed in the future. McCutchen does so at a relatively cheap salary, but at one huge cost.
The package required to take McCutchen from the Pirates would be monstrous. The prospects would likely include all your favorites, Manny Banuelos, Dellin Betances, Gary Sanchez, and more. You would be trading the immediate farm system for almost a guaranteed star. As painful as it would be, the Yankees can afford it. Aside from their need in the outfield, the Yankees have a long term plan at every position. The top prospects preparing to join the team most immediately aren’t necessary, and following the Yankees’ recent maneuvering, would likely become trade bait anyway.
If the Yankees are truly looking to trade their young excess pitching for a young bat, they should aim for the best they can, Andrew McCutchen. He answers a lot of the Yankees’ questions about the future. With almost all high-ceiling prospects leaving the organization in a deal, there is a large gamble involved with a deal. That would be a gamble I’m willing to take.
The backlash against the selection of Cito Culver in the 1st round in the 2010 MLB draft was pretty severe, as he wasn’t on any mainstream prospect evaluator’s radar as a 1st round candidate. The early scouting reports didn’t sound much like a 1st-round prospect, describing him as a future defense-first shortstop with his arm representing his only potential plus tool. There were concerns about his ability to switch-hit in the future, as well as a lack of power projection. If these scouting reports were to be believed, it wouldn’t sound like Culver had the ceiling that one would expect from a 1st-round high school prospect. Since Culver is a shortstop, there was concern that the Yankees were drafting for need and going cheap rather than taking a big bonus baby with their pick.
For those of us who trust the Yankee front office, there is plenty of room for optimism. First is the hope that the Yankees simply had a better read on a local (well, Rochester) kid that most scouts had not seen very much of prior to the draft, and that they obviously liked what they saw. Second is Culver’s age, which as I wrote about previously, has been shown to historically cause young high school hitters to be underrated. Drafted at 17 and playing a full season in the New York-Penn League at 18, Culver has more type to develop physically and improve his tools than your typical high school draftee, but also has a fair amount of professional experience.
Culver’s results so far have done little to mollify his critics, particularly about his offensive projection. He has not broken a .700 OPS, and has managed only 4 home runs in 125 career games. On the bright side has shown some base-stealing ability, swiping 10 in Staten Island last year without being caught once. He has also shown solid plate discipline for such a young player, walking in about 10% of his plate appearances. Considering that Culver was the age of many players who were drafted a year later, the fact that he is not being totally overmatched at this level is worthy of note.
Looking ahead to 2012, Culver will make his full-season debut as the shortstop of a star-studded Charleston team. Once again, he (along with Angelo Gumbs) will likely be one of the youngest players in the league. From a statistical perspective, my expectations for Culver are not exceptionally high. If he can continue to maintain a disciplined approach at the plate and not be overmatched by Sally League pitching, I will consider it progress even if his offensive production is middling.
At a certain point I will want to see him hit for a higher average and show a little more pop, but I don’t think he is at the point where failure to improve his performance will kill his prospect status. Young as he is, especially coming out of an area that is not exactly a baseball hotbed, I am going to give him a bit of a longer rope before I come close to writing him off as a failure. 2012 should be a challenging season for Culver, but I am hopeful he can rise to the occasion and begin to justify the risk that the Yankees took in drafting him so high.
Update: As Yankee10570 points out in the comment section, Cito did just tweet about having an MRI today. Hopefully this is nothing serious, but I’m sure we’ll hear more as things develop.
Update: All is well
Yoenis Cespedes is officially a free agent. The hype on Cespedes has started to settle down, and so has the rumored price. Instead of looking at him as a $50-$60 million player, he may sign in a much more reasonable $15-20 million range. At that price, I think the Yankees would be wise to consider him. You probably know the story by now: he’s a 5-tool outfielder whose best tool is making awesome workout videos. And hitting for power too.
I wrote about Cespedes in December,
Add this all up, and I could see the logic behind starting Cespedes at Double-A Trenton, then quickly moving him up to Triple-A. This would set up for a very late 2012 (September?) debut/audition, and possibly 2013 starting job.
That 2013 target date is very important. Nick Swisher will be a free agent after the 2012 season, and Curtis Granderson will be in the final season of his contract. Brett Gardner will be 29 years old, and his own free agency will start to appear on the horizon. Mason Williams, even if everything goes well, will likely be at Double-A or Triple-A. The Yankees would be in a position to both try Cespedes in center field, shifting Granderson to right, while still having plenty of insurance around if he failed to hit or play the position well. If he can’t handle center defensively, they have the better of Gardner and Granderson to pick from while Cespedes plays a corner spot. And, if he completely sucks, resigning Nick Swisher is always an option. The Yankees get to take a high-dollar risk, but hold a bunch of options in reserve in case it does not work out.
I still see a lot of value in what I wrote a month ago for the Yankees, especially after the Pineda trade. On Monday, I wrote that 2012 would be a clarifying year for the Yankee starting rotation: they’ll know a lot more about if they really are set up long term, or if they need to go out and make changes. At the same time, they’ll face important long-term decisions about their outfield. Nick Swisher will be a free agent, and Curtis Granderson will have just one year to go.
If the Yankees were to sign Yoenis Cespedes, they would be taking a huge gamble. But at the same time, they would know a lot about whether or not that gamble will succeed by the end of 2013. Cespedes will have a full season of minor league statistics to represent his abilities. He may even have some token major league service time. If he’s doing well, the Yankees can let Nick Swisher go. If he’s doing poorly, Nick Swisher may look like the best option out there. Cespedes would open up another set of options for a roster in flux, yet looking to get under $189 million. The best-case scenario of a solidified Yankee rotation of C.C. Sabathia and four minimum-salary starters and a successful Yoenis Cespedes minor league debut would open up a whole range of great options for the Yankees, such as an expensive catching acquisition or free agent pitching upgrade.
For a team that doesn’t really have all that much outfield depth, and with two outfield free agencies on the horizon, I think this may be exactly the move they ought make. It all really comes down to how reasonable his price is. I’d be willing to offer him something a little smaller than the Aroldis Chapman contract, maybe 5 years @ $4.5 million plus a substantial team option for a 6th year. I think that’s a reasonable price to roll the dice.
(The following is being syndicated from An A-Blog for A-Rod)
2011 was an important year for Russell Martin. After two All Star-caliber seasons for the Dodgers in 2007 and 2008, he was basically cast aside like an old mitt after experiencing serious decline, much of it likely injury-related, in 2009 and 2010. The Yankees were happy to pick him up off the scrap heap for $4 million and install him as their bridge between the Jorge Posada and Jesus Montero Eras behind the plate in 2011. A funny thing happened on the way to that plan, though, as Martin bounced back this past season, regaining some of his All Star form and making his way back onto the All Star team. The Yankees rewarded Martin for his 2011 with a 1-year/$7.5 million deal on Tuesday, in the process implying that they may still not be 100% sold on Martin as a long-term fixture behind the plate, even with Jorge and Jesus out of the picture. In looking at Martin’s 2011 numbers, there are a few things that he could do in 2012 that could keep his upward momentum going and instill some more confidence in the organization to extend him beyond this season.
Martin’s final line of .237/.324/.408 with a .325 wOBA in 2011 was a step in the right direction from where he had been trending the previous two years, but still not up to the standard he set in ’07-’08. After a torrid start in the season’s opening month (.293/.376/.587, .420 wOBA) Martin cooled off considerably and was up and down at best for the remainder. The first two numbers that stand out to me when trying to explain Martin’s 2011 are his BB and K rates. Martin has shown from Day 1 in the Majors that he has a very good eye at the plate. Even in 2009 and 2010, his BB rates didn’t decline with the rest of his production, but in 2011 he posted a 10.5% BB rate, the lowest value of his career since the 9.6% he put up in his rookie season of 2006. Martin coupled this lower BB rate with a career high 17.0% K rate, certainly not something that qualifies him as a hacker, but nonetheless greater than what he’s traditionally shown.
A contributing factor to those changes could certainly be Martin’s career high Swing Rate in 2011, 43.5% according to PITCHf/x, as could his career high 8.3% Swinging Strike rate. But deeper than that, the numbers that concerned me the most were the number of pitches Martin was seeing in his plate appearances. In 2011 Martin averaged 3.74 pitches per plate appearance, below what was his 3.89 career average and even further below the P/PA values in the high 3.90s that he had in his career years. Paired with the increased swing rates, these numbers suggest that Martin was being a bit too aggressive in his approach at the plate and putting himself in too many unfavorable counts. When in those type of counts, a hitter will tend to take more defensive swings, generate less contact and less good contact, and in Martin’s case, fail to capitalize on his strength of his great batting eye at the plate. This would certainly explain the low batting average and increased K rate.
Also concerning were Martin’s contact rate splits to left, center, and right field in 2011. Martin’s track record in these categories shows that he tends to hit a lot of his ground balls to the left side and back up the middle, and starts to elevate the ball more as he goes to right. But in 2011 these splits became even more extreme:
- LF: 18.0% LD, 61.3% GB, 20.7% FB
- CF: 18.3% LD, 49.5% GB, 32.1% FB
- RF: 22.8% LD, 17.7% GB, 59.5% FB (*29.8% IFFB)
Combined with Martin’s wOBA splits of .457 to left, .239 to center, and .261 to right, these values above suggest that there are differences in Martin’s swing depending on where he tries to hit the ball, and not helpful ones. It would be one thing if he had these contact splits and was productive across the board when hitting to all fields. But the low wOBA values to center and right tell me that he’s not making a lot of quality contact on those swings, and the majority of his ground balls up the middle and fly balls to right are turning into outs. Interestingly enough, while Martin had his lowest LD and FB rates to left field, he did hit 14 of his 18 home runs in 2011 to left. So he certainly made the most of the solid fly ball contact he did make to left field.
So what does Martin need to do in 2012 to keep his production moving in the right direction. For starters, he should take more pitches. His career BB and K rates show that Martin has a very good batting eye, good plate discipline, and and an above-average ability to put the bat on the ball. If he cuts back on his swings, particularly early in the count, he can better maximize those strengths and put himself in better situations to get good pitches to hit. He can also give himself a better look at what the pitcher is offering up to him, where the pitcher is trying to pitch him, and adjust his approach accordingly in his subsequent at-bats.
Secondly, Martin needs to work with Kevin Long on shoring up the holes in his swing that could be causing these increasingly drastic GB/FB splits to the three sections of the field. Martin is clearly an effective pull hitter, both for average and for power. But there is something going on with his plate coverage and/or his swing mechanics when he tries to take the ball the other way because he’s hitting too many balls in the air that are turning into outs, and way too many balls in the air that aren’t leaving the infield. Martin’s .252 BABIP in 2011 was low by anybody’s standards and a career low for him by 32 points, and there was almost assuredly some bad luck that was a contributing factor. But with the major deviation in his wOBA to left compared to his wOBA to center and right field, it certainly seems like there are some fundamental flaws in his swing that are contributing more to the results than just luck.
Martin will turn 29 next month, so he’s clearly still in the prime of his career. He has already shown the ability to be an effective hitter to all fields, at least more effective than he was in 2011, so what changed this past season? My theory is that Martin got a little too amped up by the early success and power surge he had out of the gate last April and started to develop some bad habits, being a bit more aggressive than he traditionally is and losing some of the balance in his stroke. The effects of small flaws like that can be magnified when combined with the wear and tear that a starting catcher endures over the course of the season, and the flaws were probably never addressed as the more important focus day to day was keeping Martin healthy and on the field. Martin has already been working out for some time to get back into game shape for 2012, and hopefully he puts in time with Kevin Long before the season starts and in training camp to improve his overall approach at the plate. If he does, and we see his offensive production continue to trend upward this season, Martin could secure himself that long-term deal and settle the Yankees’ catching situation for the foreseeable future.
Whenever a pitcher moves from a pitcher’s park to a hitter’s park, there’s a concern about how he’ll adjust. This is definitely the case with Michael Pineda, who’s moving from Seattle’s spacious Safeco to the small confines of the (new incarnation of) the “Big” Ballpark in the Bronx. This post by RLYW helped to allay those fears for Pineda. Still, that doesn’t mean the concerns aren’t legitimate or aren’t there at all. To take a closer look at how park factors may affect the new Yankee right hander, I went over to StatCorner and took a peep at the park factors for Yankee Stadium III. The factors there are set for hitters. Remember that a mark over 100 favors hitters and a mark under 100 favors pitchers. So, what am I doing with these numbers? I’m taking them and applying them to Michael Pineda’s splits to get a rough projection as to how he’ll do against righties and lefties in his new digs.
We’ll go stat-by-stat, using just the numbers in the left hand column (K; BB; 1B; 2B; 3B; HR)
Strikeouts:
Lefty hitters get a 7% boost in strikeouts in YS3, so that means a drop in strikeouts by Pineda. In 2011, he struck out 74 lefty batters in 357 PAs. To keep things simple, we’ll assume the same amount of plate appearances. I’m also going to round up with calculations. 7% of 74 is 5.18, so I’ll round up to 6. Subtracting 6 from 74 gives us 68. Assuming the same amount of PAs, that still gives Pineda a 19.05% strikeout rate against lefties, which is definitely respectable.
Righty hitters get a minimal bump, just 1%. Last year, he struck out 99 in 339 PAs. 1% of 99 is .99, so we’ll round up to 1. Taking that 1 away gives us 98 strikeouts. The drop is negligible, and leaves Pineda at 28.91% strikeouts against his same-handed counterparts. Hell yes.
Walks:
Lefty hitters see an 8% uptick in walks in YS3. Pineda walked 25 lefties last year. Applying the 8% increase and keeping with the 357 PA mark, we could expect him to walk 27 southpaw hitters, a 7.56 mark. If a hitter had that walk rate, we wouldn’t sneer, but we wouldn’t exactly be impressed either.
Righties looking to draw ball four get a smaller increase than lefties, but it’s still a 4% increase. Pineda gave up a free pass to 30 righties in 339 PAs in 2011. 4% of 30 is 1.2. Let’s round up, to get 2 and add that to 30, giving us 32. That equates to a 9.44 walk rate. That’s a little paradoxical, honestly. I’d like to see that come down, but it’s still not damning.
Singles:
Finally, something that DOESN’T benefit hitters. Both lefties (4% drop) and righties (1% drop) suffer a little in terms of singles. Michael gave up 34 singles to right handers last year in 339 PAs. Applying that tiny drop would mean 33 singles against righties. He gave up 55 singles to lefties last year in 357 PAs. Dropping that down 4% would mean 52 singles surrendered to lefties.
Doubles:
There was a drop here, too, which surprised me at first. Then, I thought about it. The RCF gap in YS3 isn’t huge and the small dimensions down the corners definitely make it hard for doubles to happen. I’m assuming you’re getting tired of me explaining my methods with each one now, so just take my word for it from here on out. Adjusted for the drops (6% LHB; 8% RHB), we get 10 doubles by righties and 12 by lefties.
Triples:
YS3 crushes triples. There is basically one spot, left-center field, to get a triple and most guys aren’t fast enough to do it even then. Pineda gave up 1 triple to each handed batter, and given the dimensions of YS3, I’m okay with projecting him to give up zero triples in the Bronx.
Home Runs:
This is where it could get ugly. Obviously, YS3 is a homer friendly park. Lefties can expect a 43% (!!) increase and righties can see a 15% increase in HR production. Assuming these increases, we could expect 12 homers by righties off of Pineda and another 12 by lefties. That would mean 24 homers surrendered by Pineda at home alone, which would be a 6 HR increase over what he gave up all of last year (18). Now, this number can definitely be countered by the chart in the RLYW past linked earlier in the post, but I think this can also reinforce our concerns of Pineda. But, as we close, another thing to ally your possible fears, given this scary HR potential: homer-happy A.J. Burnett only gave up 19 homers at YS3 in 2011, so this method may overstate the case a bit.
Check back in tomorrow for the same method being applied to Hiroki Kuroda.
(The following is being syndicated from The Captain’s Blog).
Every time a player signs a mega-money deal, there seems to be a very common kneejerk reaction, particularly among saber-friendly analysts. The typical response is to run to fangraphs.com for the player’s WAR-based dollar value and then, using projections, conclude that by the end of the contract, the salary commitment will wind up being a financial burden. Unfortunately, this kind of analysis, which, admittedly, I have probably done on many occasions, completely overlooks several relevant points.
Prince Fielder followed is following in his father’s footsteps by signing with the Tigers. (Photo: Getty Images)
The free agent process isn’t about determining a player’s long-term fair value. Rather, it is the means by which a player can use leverage to maximize his earnings in an effort to make up for the six years he was underpaid because of the reserve clause. Of course, many will point out that the team that signs the free agent didn’t benefit from those six underpaid seasons, but chances are they did reap similar rewards with another player. So, all free agent contracts should be assessed with an understanding that a premium is built into the total value.
Even though WAR provides a solid framework for determining a player’s value on the field, it is not as useful for determining his worth at the negotiating table. Supply and demand are much better determinants of the latter. Using Prince Fielder’s nine-year, $214 million contract as an example, the Tigers’ need (demand) for a middle of the order bat was increased greatly by the loss of Victor Martinez for the season. So late in the winter, however, there was only one viable option (supply) to meet the need. As a result, and because other teams were also interested in the first baseman’s services, GM David Dombrowski had no choice but to up the ante (unless he was willing to enter the season with a compromised lineup). That’s what free agency is all about, and it is within that framework that contracts need to be evaluated.
If Fielder replicates his recent success over the next few seasons and helps turn the Tigers into the perennial division champion in the A.L. Central (which, considering the weakness of the division, seems likely) does it really matter if he underperforms his salary during the backend of the contract? Does Fielder’s potential to put the Tigers over the top in the short term outweigh the anchor he may become later in his career? How one answers those questions is a matter of perspective, but the opinion that counts most belongs to Tigers’ owner Mike Ilitch, who happens to be an 82-year old man worth almost $2 billion. Considering his age and wealth, it stands to reason that the short-term impact matters more to Ilitch. Along the same lines, it’s also worth noting that Fielder’s other prime suitor was the Washington Nationals, who just so happen to be owned by Ted Lerner, another 80-something billionaire (86 and almost $4 billion to be exact).
Detroit Tigers’ Financials, 2001-2010
Source: Forbes
For the last three seasons, the Tigers have been operating at a substantial loss, according to Forbes’ data, so Ilitch has clearly shown a willingness to come out of pocket to supply the Tigers’ deficiencies. Considering the team had a need for a big bat, an owner willing to pay for him, and a realistic expectation of near-term success, Fielder’s immediate marginal value seems to justify his large contract. So, instead of getting bogged down in WAR projections, Tigers’ fans are better off dreaming about titanic homeruns from Prince Fielder…the kind his daddy Cecil Fielder used to hit many years ago…and leaving concerns about the 2016 payroll to the team’s accountants.
Recent Comments